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Abstract 
 
Financial information disclosed in the annual report is one of the main 
sources that investors are interested to make informed judgment in their decision 
for investment.  Due to the financial crisis, Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance was introduced and this Code mentions that one of the tasks of the 
directors is to provide timely and useful information disclosure.  However, in 
Malaysia, there is not much study on the corporate governance in the banking 
sector even though this industry is the heart of the country economy.  Thus, this 
study investigates whether corporate governance can contribute to have better 
financial information disclosure of Malaysian listed bank by using a panel data 
regression analysis. Corporate governance variables are the board leadership 
structure, board composition, board size, director ownership, institutional 
ownership and block ownership. Disclosure index is developed by researcher and 
conducts content analysis by cross checking between the information disclosure in 
the annual reports and the disclosure index.  The opinion of accountants and 
financial analysts are used to compute weighted disclosure score because they are 
preparers and users of the accounting information. This research finds that separate 
board leadership structure, higher proportion of independent directors on the board, 
smaller board size, higher director ownership, higher institutional ownership and 
lower block ownership have higher financial information disclosure. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Corporate governance becomes an essential issue nowadays and it has been recognized as 
one of the main sources of corporate problems.  Poor corporate governance is accused as one of 
the main causes of crisis.  Many corporate governance theories and Corporate Governance Codes 
collectively agree that having good corporate governance system will strengthen the internal 
control procedures of the corporations and will enhance the disclosure information about the 
performance of the corporation (Apostolos and Konstantinos, 2009).  In addition, among the 
different types of industries, corporate governance system of banks seems to be more important 
because the banking sector is the heart of any country economic situations (Matama, 2008).  If a 
weak corporate governance exists, investors may lose confidence in the ability of a bank to 
properly manage its assets and liabilities, including deposits, which could in turn trigger a 
liquidity crisis and then it might lead to economic crisis in a country and pose a systemic risk to 
the society at large (Basel Committee on banking supervision, 2005; Garcia-Marco & Robles-
Fernandez, 2008). Therefore, it is interested to examine the importance of corporate governance 
mechanisms in the banking sector.   
Similarly, the importance of the financial information disclosure in the annual reports has 
been highlighted as one of the important aspects of the good corporate governance.  According to 
Basel committee on banking supervision (2005), Xue (2008) and Tian and Chen (2009), 
information disclosure is important as it is the heart of corporate governance.  They further state 
that good financial information disclosure is a signal for the better performance of the 
corporation, reducing the information asymmetry, clarifying the conflict of interests between the 
shareholders and the management, and making corporate management accountable.  Among the 
different types of information disclosed in the annual reports, disclosure on financial information 
is focused in this study because disclosing financial information is necessary since investors 
mainly rely on the financial information disclosed in the annual report and more financial 
information will enhance transparency, reduce opportunistic behaviors and information 
asymmetry and management cannot hold the important information for their own benefits 
(Marleen, et.al., 2005; Apostolos and Konstantinos, 2009).  However, most of the developing 
countries do not have strong policy on financial reporting (Ionescu, 2010).  Therefore, this study 
fills up the gap by examining the impact of corporate governance on financial reporting in the 
financial sector.   
It could be summed that the governance seems to be a heart of the corporation, especially 
in the banking sector and to have an influential power on information disclosure of the annual 
reports.  Hence, the aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the 
financial information disclosure of the banks.  This research is presented in 5 sections.  The 
second section discusses the relevant literature.  The third section elaborates on development of 
hypotheses and research design.  The fourth section explains findings and the last section 
concludes. 
 
 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) mention in their paper that due to the separation of 
ownership and control, agency problems, i.e. moral hazard (hidden action) and adverse selection 
(hidden information) could occur and the directors might maximize their own interests at the 
expense of the shareholders.   Thus, the main issue from the agency theory is the existence of 
agency cost (Williams et al., 2006).  The suggested mechanism to minimize this cost is good 
corporate governance (Judge et al., 2003) since it promotes goal congruence among principals 
and agents (Conyon & Schwalbach, 2000).  Cheung and Chan (2004) also describe that the 
ultimate goal of corporate governance is to monitor the management decision-making in order to 
ensure that it is in line with shareholders’ interests, and to motivate managerial behavior towards 
enhancing the firms’ wealth. It is also highlighted in this study is that information disclosure is 
one of the tool to reduce the cost of capital and to provide more transparent information to the 
shareholders. By doing that, agency conflicts will reduce since the shareholders are able to 
monitor the management based on the information disclosure.  The following discussions 
provide some explanations of corporate governance mechanisms from the agency theory 
perspective and most relevant the empirical finds related to this research.  
Regarding the issue of board leadership structure, agency theory and most of the 
corporate guidelines recommends for separate board leader structure in order to ensure that the 
performance of the CEO is independently monitored by the different person, i.e. board chairman 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Florackis & Ozkan, 2004).  The independence of the board attained 
by separate leadership is necessary so that the board will be able to give pressure on the 
management led by CEO in disclosing the more material information about the company, which 
is in line with the interest of the shareholders.  Hence, it could be assumed that the separate 
leadership structure will lead to better financial information disclosure about the companies.  The 
findings of Ho and Wong (2001), Gul and Leung (2004), Lakhal (2005), Byard, Li and Weintrop 
(2006) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007) are in line with theoretical expectation. This means that 
there is a positive relationship between separate leadership structure and disclosure.  In the case 
of study by Norita and Shamsul Nahar (2004), the results show that separate leadership structure 
is not associated with disclosure.     
According to Choe and Lee (2003), board composition is very important to effectively 
monitor the managers and reduce the agency cost.  Although the executive directors have 
specialized skills, expertise and valuable knowledge of the firms’ operating policies and day-to-
day activities, there is a need for the independent directors to contribute the fresh ideas, 
independence, objectivity and expertise gained from their own fields (Weir, 2003).  Hence, the 
agency theory recommends the involvement of independent non-executive directors to monitor 
any self-interested actions by managers and to minimize agency costs (Florackis & Ozkan, 2004; 
Williams et al. 2006).  In addition, it can be derived from the agency theory that higher 
proportion of the independent non-executive directors on the board will be result in higher 
disclosure of the material aspects of the company in order to increase the transparency since 
independent boards will be able to encourage the management to disclose more information.  
The findings of Chen and Jaggi (2000), Gul and Leung (2004), Byard et al. (2006), and Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006) and Norita and Shamsul Nahar (2004.) are in line with theoretical 
expectation.   
 
In order to have the effective number of board size, Jensen (1983) and Florackis and 
Ozkan (2004) suggest not having more than seven or eight members to avoid less effective 
coordination, communication, and decision making.  Smaller board size seems to be more 
conducive to board member participation and thus would result in a positive impact on the 
monitoring function and the decision-making capability of the board, and independence from the 
management (Huther, 1997).  It is expected that smaller board size should be able to monitor the 
decision of the management related to the information disclosure.  This expectation is supported 
by the findings of Byard et al. (2006).  They study 1279 firms over the years 2000 to 2002 and 
find that financial disclosure related to forecast information decreases with board size.  However, 
the finding of Lakhal (2005) show that there is an insignificant and weak association between 
board size and disclosure.  
Agency theory stresses the importance of ownership structure in enhancing corporate 
governance. It could be viewed from three different perspectives; (a) director ownership, (b) 
block ownership, and (c) institutional ownership. If directors own shares, the directors as the 
owners themselves are directly instructing and monitoring the management of the companies 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Hence, there are likely to be fewer agency problems as compared to 
the situation where the directors, who are not the owners, supervise the management of the 
company.  It is also supported by Seifert et al. (2005) who discuss agency conflicts.  However, in 
the case of information disclosure, the effect of director ownership on disclosure might be 
different from that of the block holders and institutional investors.  Directors who have 
substantial amount of share ownership might not want to disclose the information to the outsiders 
because they can use their discretionary powers to spend firm resources in ways that serve their 
own interest at the expense of other shareholders and then they might want to conceal fraud and 
incompetence, if any. Therefore, it could be expected that there is a negative relationship 
between director ownership and disclosure.  Theoretical expectation seems to be supported by 
Chau and Gray (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), and Leung and Horwitz (2004).   
With regard to block ownership, if an individual has a substantial amount of interest in a 
particular company (usually measured at 5%), he or she will be more interested in the company, 
compared to the shareholders who own a smaller number of shares because dispersed ownership 
may have less incentives to monitor management (Kim & Lee, 2003).   Ownership by the block 
holders is an important player to have higher disclosure since they have the voting power that 
could be used as a tool to monitor the agents (David & Kochhar, 1996). Agency theory also 
suggests that block holders have the interests in the firms; most likely they might put the pressure 
on the management to disclose all the material information.  This could be due to the significant 
proportion of shares held by block holders.  Therefore, it could be expected that there is a 
positive relationship between block holders and disclosure.  Chau and Gray (2002), Luo, 
Courtenay and Hossain (2006)
1
, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) and Norita and Shamsul Nahar 
(2004) find that extent of outside block ownership is positively associated with disclosures and 
hence their finding is in line with theoretical expectation.  However, Eng and Mak (2003) find 
that block holder ownership is not related to disclosure.   
 
                                                          
 
Lastly, regarding institutional investors, Salleh and Mallin (2002), Kim and Nofsinger 
(2004), Leng (2004), Soloman and Solomon (2004), Seifert et al. (2005), Le et al. (2006), 
Langnan, Steven and Weibin (2007) and Ramzi (2008) collectively agree on the important role 
of institutional shareholders in the monitoring of firms.  Ownership by the institutional 
shareholders is large enough to motivate them to monitor, compared to a shareholder with small 
amount of ownership. Therefore, it could be expected that there is a positive relationship 
between institutional investors and disclosure.  The findings of Eng and Mak (2003), and Lakhal 
(2005) are in line with theoretical expectation.  However, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) find that 
there is state ownership and legal ownership is not related to disclosure.  
 
3.0 Development of Hypotheses and Research Design 
3.1 Development of Hypotheses 
Disclosing the material information, especially financial information disclosure, of the 
firms reduces the information asymmetry between the management and the owners, and it will 
also reduce the agency conflicts between them (Apostolos & Konstantinos, 2009; Akhtaruddin & 
Hossain, 2008).  Disclosure is an integral part of the corporate governance because it shows the 
extent of how good corporate governance is (Patel et al., 2002; United Nation, 2003).  Leong 
(2005) also mentions that disclosure and transparency are partners of good corporate governance.  
Moreover, Beekes and Brown (2006) study 250 Australian firms rated in the 2002 Horwath 
Corporate Governance Report and find that better-governed firms do make more informative 
disclosure.  Hence, the researcher is interested to examine whether corporate governance 
variables could affect the financial  information disclosure and the following hypotheses are 
developed.   
Ha1: Financial information disclosure is positively related to separate leadership structure. 
Ha2: Financial information disclosure is positively related to proportion of independent non-
executive directors on the board. 
Ha3: Financial information disclosure is negatively related to board size. 
Ha4: Financial information disclosure is negatively related to director ownership.   
Ha5: Financial information disclosure is positively related to block ownership.   
Ha6: Financial information disclosure is positively related to institutional ownership.   
 
3.2 Research Design 
Variables and Empirical Model 
Dependent Variable 
Weighted financial information disclosure score is used as a dependent variable; 
questionnaire is developed to obtain views on the importance of each disclosure item from 
financial analysts and accountants.  Before the actual questionnaire is sent, pilot test has been 
conducted and the findings show that alpha value is 0.94 and so it has been concluded that the 
questionnaire is reliable.  In addition, pilot test results show that the overall mean score for 
comprehensiveness of the questionnaire is 4.05, for understandability of the questions are 4.10 
and for understandability of the instruction is 4.62.  Therefore, it can be concluded that the pilot 
test questionnaire is good enough to be used as an actual questionnaire.   
The weighted financial information disclosure score used in this study is based on the 
opinions of one hundred and thirty one accountants and fifty one financial analysts.  There is no 
non-response bias from the questionnaire received from the accountants and financial analysts 
based on T statistics and Mann-Whitney U test.  The reliability test results show that the alpha 
value is 0.9 and so the weighted financial accounting disclosure score used in this study is 
reliable. The annual reports of the sample companies are checked against disclosure index 
developed by the researcher.  The researcher uses dichotomous score, i.e. one is given if the 
company discloses the information, and zero for otherwise.  Since the annual reports are checked 
against the disclosure index to provide the disclosure score, during this process, some of the 
disclosures in the annual reports are not clear for the researcher to decide whether some parts of 
annual report disclosure represent the items from the disclosure index.  Hence, for these 
confusing items, questionnaire is constructed and sent to the ten accountants and six financial 
analysts in order to seek their opinions on whether these confusing disclosures in the annual 
reports represent the items in the disclosure check list.  It is found out that there is no significant 
difference between the score provided by the researcher and the answers provided by the selected 
accountants and financial analysts.  Finally, the weight for each disclosure item is calculated by 
the mean score of each disclosure item provided by the accountants and financial analysts.   
Independent Variables 
There are six independent variables which comprise of three structural measures of 
corporate governance (i.e. board leadership structure, board composition and board size) and 
three measures of ownership structure (i.e. director ownership, institutional ownership, and block 
ownership).  Finally, the empirical model of the study also includes two control variables related 
to firm-specific characteristics (i.e. firm size and leverage).  The complete empirical model is as 
follow.  
Yit= βo + β1 x1it+β2 x2it − β3 x3it − β4 x4it+β5 x5it + β6 x6it + β7 x7it + β8 x8it  + µit  
 Where,  
i = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 
t=1, 2, 3, 4, 5,6,7,8,9,10 
Y= Weighted financial information disclosure score 
x1=   Board leadership structure (BLS) 
x2= Proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board (INE_BZ) 
x3= Board size (BZ) 
x4= Proportion of director ownership (DOWN) 
x5= Proportion of institutional ownership (IOWN) 
x6=  Proportion of block ownership (BOWN) 
x7= Log of total assets (TA) 
x8=  Leverage (TD_TE) 
µ= Error term 
 
Sample selection and Statistical Methods 
Samples includes the twelve listed companies whose main activity is banking from 1996 
until 2005.  The sample period covers five years before and after Corporate Governance was 
introduced in 2001. The total number of observations is 120 observations. However, some of the 
observations need to be dropped due to unavailability of data and some companies were not 
classified as banks in all the ten years’ period. It left the final observations to 108 observations. 
Data were collected either from the annual reports of the companies or from Bloomberg. The 
statistical method used in this study is robust regression.   
 
4.0 Profile of the Respondents 
Overall, both male and female respondents seem to be equally distributed since forty nine 
percent of the respondents are male and fifty one percent of them are female.  Regarding 
educational background, the majority of them are bachelor degree holders, and the balances are 
professional certificate holders.  Since fifty seven percent of the respondents are from the audit 
firms and forty three percent of them are from the non-audit firms, the opinion seems not to be 
too much influenced by one particular group although majority of the respondents are 
accountants.  The age range of the majority is between twenty and twenty nine, followed by the 
age range between thirty and thirty nine.  In terms of working experience, majority of the 
respondents, i.e. forty three percent, are below three years in the current profession and twenty 
three percent of them have working experience between three to seven years.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:Profile of respondents 
 Accountants Financial analysts Overall 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Gender             
Male 52 39.69 37.00 72.55 89.00 48.90 
Female 79 60.31 14.00 27.45 93.00 51.10 
Total 131 100.00 51.00 100.00 182.00 100.00 
Educational background        
Bachelor degree 74 56.92 25.00 50.00 99.00 55.00 
Master 6 4.62 19.00 38.00 25.00 13.89 
Ph.D   1.00 2.00 1.00 0.56 
Professional qualification 
(ACCA, CIMA, CFA, etc) 50 38.46 5.00 10.00 55.00 30.56 
Total 130 100.00 50.00 100.00 180.00 100.00 
Employment category       
Audit firm 103 78.63 1.00 1.96 104.00 57.14 
Non-audit firm 28 21.37 50.00 98.04 78.00 42.86 
Total 131 100.00 51.00 100.00 182.00 100.00 
Age range       
Below 20       
20 – 29      63 48.09 11.00 21.57 74.00 40.66 
30-39           35 26.72 22.00 43.14 57.00 31.32 
40-49          27 20.61 14.00 27.45 41.00 22.53 
50-59            4 3.05 4.00 7.84 8.00 4.40 
60 and above 2 1.53   2.00 1.10 
Total 131 100.00 51.00 100.00 182.00 100.00 
Working experience 
with current profession             
Below 3 years        63.00 48.09 15.00 29.41 78.00 42.86 
3 – 7       29.00 22.14 13.00 25.49 42.00 23.08 
8 – 12         16.00 12.21 10.00 19.61 26.00 14.29 
13 – 17        15.00 11.45 7.00 13.73 22.00 12.09 
18 – 22          2.00 1.53 3.00 5.88 5.00 2.75 
23 – 27          2.00 1.53 3.00 5.88 5.00 2.75 
Above 27  4.00 3.05   4.00 2.20 
Total 131.00 100.00 51.00 100.00 182.00 100.00 
Additional information       
Masters   1.00 1.96 1.00 0.55 
Professional qualifications 
(ACCA, CIMA, CFA, etc) 15.00 11.45 7.00 13.73 22.00 12.09 
 
5.0 Discussion on the Results  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study.  In case of 
board leadership structure, its mean value (0.81) shows that a majority of the companies have 
separate leadership structure although the minimum value (zero) shows that there are companies 
which have combined leadership structure.  Similar to the recommendation of the MCCG (2001), 
the sample mean value (0.36) shows that ratio of independent directors is slightly more than one 
third of the total number of the directors.  The mean value (8.23) of board size shows existence 
of a quite a reasonable board size, e.g. Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that a board size of not 
more than 7 or 8 members is considered reasonable in ensuring effectiveness. For ownership, the 
mean values of director ownership and institutional ownership are 0.02 and 0.17 respectively.  
The ownership of shares by directors can be considered very low where, on average, only 2 
percent of shares owned by the directors. On the other hand, institutional investors, on average, 
owned 17 percent of shares which could still be considered low although it is significantly higher 
than the ownership by the directors.  In the case of block ownership, its mean value (0.53) shows 
that the significant portion of the shares is owned by large shareholders.  The mean value of 
weighted financial disclosure score is 182.34. As for the firm-specific characteristics, the sample 
companies have the means values of RM45992.19 millions for total assets and 344.73 for the 
ratio of total debt to total equity.  
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics: Independent, dependent and control variables 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Independent variables             
(a) CG 
variables               
BLS 0.81 0.40 0.00 1.00 1.00 -1.57 0.46 
INE_BZ 0.36 0.18 0.10 0.33 0.83 0.68 -0.49 
BZ 8.23 2.34 4.00 8.00 14.00 0.33 -0.62 
(b) Ownership 
variables        
DOWN 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.25 3.26 10.40 
IOWN 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.09 0.64 1.00 -0.53 
BOWN 0.53 0.21 0.00 0.58 1.00 -0.81 0.04 
Dependent 
variable        
(e) Disclosure 
variable        
WDS 182.34 17.01 145.78 168.35 189.41 -0.78 0.70 
Control variables             
TA 45992.19 40245.92 1120.36 33326.95 191895.30 1.54 2.28 
TD_TE 344.73 331.14 14.03 223.80 1442.26 1.60 1.89 
Note: WDS refers to weighted financial information disclosure score. 
 
Table 3 shows the results on disclosure of financial information.  BLS, INE_BZ (at 1% 
Sig. level), BZ and IOWN (at 5% Sig. level) are in line with hypothesis while the rest are not.  
Thus, it can be generally concluded that separate board leadership structure, higher proportion of 
independent directors on the board, smaller board size, higher director ownership, higher 
institutional ownership and lower block ownership have higher financial information disclosure.   
Table 3 
GLS results of disclosure: Financial information 
 
 Coefficient Z_value P value 
Independent 
variables    
BLS 3.23 0.74 0.46 
INE_BZ 18.54 3.52* 0.00 
BZ -0.06 -0.11 0.91 
DOWN 4.86 0.12 0.90 
IOWN 26.65 2.25** 0.02 
BOWN -4.21 -0.87 0.38 
Control variables    
LNTA 16.02 5.9* 0.00 
TD_TE -0.02 -3* 0.00 
    
CONS -32.92 -1.47 0.14 
    
Chi-Sq.   4493.86* 
P value   0.00 
Heteroskedastic LR Chi
2
   64.78* 
(LR Test) P value   0.00 
Autocorrelation F statistics  13.61* 
(Wooldridge Test) P value   0.00 
* Significant at 1%   
** Significant at 
5%   
 
 
6.0 Conclusion and Area for Future Research 
In summary, this study examines whether better corporate governance can contribute 
towards higher financial information disclosure.  The sample consists of 12 banks listed on Bursa 
Malaysia for the periods of 5 years pre and post introducing of the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (2011). The findings of panel data regression show that separate board leadership 
structure, higher proportion of independent directors on the board, smaller board size, higher 
director ownership, higher institutional ownership and lower block ownership have higher 
financial information disclosure.  Hence, for future research, it can be extended by interviewing 
the board to directors about their perceptions towards financial information disclosure and 
compare with the actual financial disclosure in the annual report.  In addition, the researchers 
should consider other corporate governance variables which might influence the banks to 
disclose more financial information disclosure. 
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